

Model Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Hearing and Denial of Continuances: Instruction Sheet

Sometimes Respondents (individuals whom the Domestic Violence Restraining Order is against) ask the court to continue, or delay, the hearing date for the restraining order because of a criminal case. The person requesting the restraining order (the "Petitioner") might not want the hearing continued because it is hard for them to come back to court – just to have the case continued again– for various reasons. Some reasons a Petitioner might not want the hearing continued the trauma of seeing the Respondent many times at court, the cost of taking time off from work, and the difficulty of finding childcare. The attached model memorandum can be used to ask the court to not continue the case and to hold a hearing on the request for a restraining order.

This model Memorandum of Points and Authorities (MPA) may be used by the petitioner to object (oppose) when the court is considering granting (giving) the respondent one or more continuances so that the restraining order hearing takes place after the criminal matter is completed. This is sometimes referred to as "trailing" the criminal matter. The petitioner can use the MPA to ask that the judge stop continuing the case and hold the hearing on the long-term restraining order right away.

The MPA argues that having the hearing on the petitioner's request for a long-term restraining order is not going to have a "prejudicial" or harmful effect on the respondent's criminal case. In legal matters, "prejudice" means that it will have a potentially bad impact on someone's rights. Since the respondent will not be harmed by having the hearing on the long-term restraining order, there is no reason to make the petitioner wait until the criminal case is finished. On the other hand, the longer the hearing is continued, the longer the petitioner must wait for a protective order that they need.

To use this MPA, the petitioner should simply fill in the information highlighted in yellow. The highlighted places are mostly about the parties' information, case information, and the various dates of hearings that have been scheduled and continued. Make sure that the petitioner changes the highlighted sections to state what happened in their case.

Once the information has been filled in for the individual, file it with the court to request that the hearing not be continued any further.

For questions, contact FVAP at info@fvaplaw.org or call the office at (510) 858-7358

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3	Petitioner:
4	Address line 1
5	Address line 2
6	Phone:
7	email:
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10	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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12	FOR THE COUNTY OF
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15)
16)
17 18	Petitioner-Plaintiff,)) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
19	v.) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
20) HEARING AND DENIAL OF
21) CONTINUANCES
22 23) CASE NUMBER:
23 24	Respondent-Defendant)
25)
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29	I. Introduction
30	A hearing was held on <u>(date)</u> where a continuance was granted until
31	<u>(date)</u> , pursuant to respondent's request. The basis for the continuance was the
32	respondent's Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination. The respondent provided no
33	specific basis for delaying the hearing other than the fact that a criminal case is ongoing.
34	Petitioner requests that no further continuances be granted and the Domestic Violence
35	Prevention Act (DVPA) hearing proceed on the merits as scheduled on <u>(date)</u> .
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II. Argument

A. The Respondent Has No Constitutional Right Against Self-Incrimination in a DVPA Case

43 The Constitution does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome 44 of criminal proceedings. (Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro (9th Cir. 1989) 889 F.2d 899, 902.) 45 A civil defendant does not have the absolute right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. 46 (Fuller v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 299, 305-306; In re Marriage of Sachs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1155-1156.) Instead, the court must conduct a particularized inquiry to decide 47 whether the privilege is well founded for each specific area that the questioning party seeks to 48 49 explore. (Fisher v. Gibson, (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 275, 285.) Only after the party claiming the privilege 50 objects with specificity to the information sought can the court decide whether the privilege may be invoked. (Id.) 51

Petitioner objects to the respondent's invocation of a blanket privilege against selfincrimination. Evidence offered in support of petitioner's domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) is freely accessible and/or already in the possession of detectives and the District Attorney.
Therefore, there is no particularized harm associated with proceeding with the present case.

Family Code section 245(a) entitles the respondent in a DVPA case to "one continuance for
a reasonable period, *to respond to the petition*." (Italics added.) Respondent has had well over a month
to prepare for the hearing on <u>(date)</u>. Moreover, any resources expended or defenses raised by
the respondent in the DVPA case only serve to benefit <u>him/her/them</u> in the criminal case.

The Constitutional provision against self-incrimination is "an option of refusal and not a
prohibition of inquiry." (*In re Application of Lemon* (1936) 15 Cal.App.2d 82, 89.) Were it otherwise,
any suspect would be sacrosanct, and witnesses most likely to know the facts could refuse to aid in
the investigation of the crime. (*Id.*)

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B. Petitioner Has an Interest in Prompt Resolution of the Case

65 Courts must consider the interests of the plaintiff in civil litigation where the defendant is
66 exposed to parallel criminal prosecution. (*Fuller v. Superior Court* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 299, 306.)
67 Plaintiffs are entitled to an expeditious and fair resolution of their civil claims without being

subjected to unwarranted surprise or delay. (*Id.*) This is consistent with the clear statutory mandate
of the Family Code, which requires that a hearing on the request for a long-term domestic violence
restraining order be held promptly "[w]ithin 21 days, or, if good cause appears to the court, 25 days
from the date that a temporary restraining order is granted or denied" (Cal. Fam. Code sec 242(a).)

The petitioner in the present case has been exposed to <u>months/years</u> of abuse from the
respondent, which is documented in <u>his/her/their</u> declaration and associated submissions.
<u>He/she/they has/have</u> shown the courage to extricate <u>himself/herself/themselves</u> from the abusive
relationship and has a strong interest in permanent and expeditious disentanglement from the
respondent. By continuing the case, the petitioner is being forced to face <u>his/her/their</u> abuser
multiple times over an extended period of time, which only serves to perpetuate the trauma while
providing no concomitant safeguard to the respondent.

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C. The Respondent Is Not Unfairly Prejudiced by Proceeding with the Hearing

Just as the respondent is free to selectively testify or offer evidence in the DVPA hearing, 80 81 <u>he/she/they</u> is/are also free to stay silent or submit nothing. The consequence of failing to mount a 82 defense in a DVPA hearing against documented evidence of domestic violence is unclear. However, assuming arguendo that the respondent does desire to raise rebuttal evidence in the DVPA case, it is 83 84 unclear how that evidence would not also be beneficial to <u>his/her/their</u> criminal case (i.e., how 85 <u>he/she/they</u> would be criminally prejudiced). Finally, even if there were a scenario where the restraining order would be denied but for the defendant's introduction of criminally detrimental 86 87 evidence, the respondent still would not be deprived of any substantial right or property.

88 The purpose of DVPA proceedings is not to punish respondents, but to prevent future domestic abuse and to provide for a separation between the parties. The petitioner in a restraining 89 order case is unlike other civil litigants because of the risk of physical and psychological harm. Thus, 90 91 the court should be even more protective of petitioner's rights in this DVPA case than it would with ordinary civil plaintiffs. While the respondent suffers no real injury from proceeding with the 92 present case in parallel with his/her/their criminal case, the petitioner is being denied something real 93 and immediate. She/he/they is/are being denied closure and forced to repeatedly face her/his/their 94 95 abuser in dissidence with the underlying purpose of a DVPA restraining order, which is to put 96 separation between the parties.

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D. Continued Delay Is a Waste of Judicial Resources

Efficient use of judicial resources and the convenience of the court in the management of its
cases should be considered when determining whether to hear or delay the case. (*Keating, supra*, 45
F.3d 322 at pp. 324-325.) A defendant may not bring a civil action to a halt simply by invoking the
privilege against self-incrimination. (*Oiye v. Fox* (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1037.)

The current criminal case could go on for an extended period of time and there is always a
potential for future criminal investigation and/or charges. Consequently, if the court grants
continuances in this DVPA action without requiring any showing of particularized harm, there is the
potential that the present case could go on for a significant amount of time, resulting in further
continuances, additional docketing, courtroom time, and rescheduling. This is a waste of judicial
resources.

Here, the court and the petitioner have an interest in preventing undue delay, especially
where there is no resultant prejudice or injury to the respondent. On balance, proceeding
expeditiously with the DVPA hearing is in the best interest of justice.

111	
112	CONCLUSION
113	In view of the foregoing, it is requested that the DVPA hearing proceed as planned on
114	<u>(date)</u> .
115 116	Dated: Signed:
117	<u>(Name)</u>
118	Petitioner
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