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Why this case is important:

• This is the first case to explain that Code of Civil Procedure section 533 allows courts to modify or dissolve existing restraining orders, but does not let courts dismiss a pending Domestic Violence Restraining Order (DVRO) request that has not been decided.
• This is also the first case to explain that parties must have advanced notice and a meaningful chance to respond to requests to modify or terminate an existing
  restraining order under section 533. A same-day oral request is not enough advance notice and does not give the other party enough time to respond.
• This is the first case to explain that a court’s right to manage its calendar does not allow it to dismiss a DVRO request simply because the hearing is taking too long. The opinion emphasizes that DVRO requests should be decided on their merits and that a court’s concern for their calendar and efficiency are less important than the Domestic Violence Prevention Act’s (DVPA’s) purpose and the strong policy favoring decisions on the merits. Here, the trial court improperly favored speed over justice by dismissing the DVRO request without deciding whether abuse had occurred.

Summary of the case:

Wife sought a DVRO protecting herself and the parties’ child from Husband. The trial court issued a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO), and continued the DVRO hearing multiple times. During the DVRO trial that lasted three court dates, Wife presented extensive evidence of alleged abuse.

On the final hearing date, Husband’s attorney orally asked the court to dissolve the DVTRO and dismiss the entire case under Code of Civil Procedure section 533, arguing, among other things, that the temporary order had been in place for long time and that Husband had not violated it. Rather than decide whether Wife had proved abuse, the trial court asked Husband a few questions—mainly about how he would interact with Wife in the future—and then dissolved the DVTRO and dismissed the entire DVRO action because neither side had finished presenting its case within the time allotted.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding:

1. Code of Civil Procedure section 533 did not allow the trial court to dismiss Wife’s unresolved DVRO request nor allow the trial court to dissolve of her DVTRO without acceptable notice. Section 533 allows a court, “on notice,” to modify or dissolve an existing injunction or temporary restraining order when certain circumstances exist, including when “the ends of justice would be served.” It does not allow a court to dismiss a pending DVRO request. And although section 533 gave the court authority to consider dissolving the DVTRO, the trial court erred because Wife did not get enough notice. The Court of Appeal held that this same-day oral notice was insufficient because Wife did not have a meaningful opportunity to gather evidence and prepare an opposition. The Court therefore reversed the dismissal of Wife’s DVRO request and the dissolution of her DVTRO.
2. The trial court’s inherent authority to manage its calendar also did not justify dismissing the DVRO case. Courts may impose reasonable time limits, exclude repetitive or irrelevant evidence, and otherwise keep proceedings moving. But the trial court here did more than regulate the hearing—it dismissed the entire DVRO action without deciding the merits.
3. The Court of Appeal emphasized that case-management concerns and judicial efficiency cannot override the strong public policy favoring decisions on the merits, particularly in DVRO cases. The Legislature has recognized domestic violence as an urgent public safety and public health crisis, and the DVPA is intended to help survivors obtain protection without delay. Because of this, the Court of Appeal decided the trial court incorrectly put court efficiency over justice when it dismissed the Wife’s DVRO request for procedural reasons.

View the full Case Alert for practice tips. | View the Published Opinion.

Why this case is important:

This case creates a process judges must use if a DVRO respondent requests a continuance based on 5th Amendment concerns. First, the court must decide if there actually is a concern that the respondent will be forced to incriminate themselves. For many DVRO requests, the abuse is not also a crime, so the 5th Amendment doesn’t apply.

If there is a legitimate 5th Amendment concern, then the court must weigh 5 factors to decide if a continuance is appropriate:

1. The respondent’s 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination and how the respondent would be burdened if the hearing was not continued;
2. The petitioner’s interest in proceeding and whether delaying the hearing would be unfair to the petitioner – for example, the petitioner’s witnesses are already at court and the witnesses may not be able to come back on another day;
3. The court’s interest in efficiently managing court resources;
4. The interests of nonparties – such as additional protected parties who need protection or children who need custody and support orders; and,
5. The Domestic Violence Prevention Act’s (DVPA’s) purpose of quickly resolving DVRO proceedings.

If these factors do not weigh in favor of the request to continue then the hearing must go forward that day. The Court of Appeal explained, the fact someone is charged with a crime “cannot give him a blank check to block” non-criminal cases about the same facts, justice may require allowing the restraining order case to go forward.

Summary of the case:

Eric requested a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against his ex-spouse Tiare, who sent hundreds of texts and emails over a short period of time to Eric and the person he was dating. Eric received a temporary restraining order (TRO) that protected both him and the person he was dating. Tiare then broke into Eric’s yard and physically attacked Eric. Tiare was arrested and a Criminal Protective Order (CPO) was issued to protect Eric. Despite the CPO and TRO, Tiare went to Eric’s home and continued to contact him.

At the first hearing on the DVRO Tiare received a continuance under Family Code section 245(a), which gives a continuance to anyone who hasn’t filed a response yet. Two more hearings were scheduled. At each hearing Tiare requested and received a continuance. The matter was re-scheduled for a fourth time, approximately 4 months after the initial hearing date. At the 4th hearing Tiare requested another continuance raising 5th Amendment concerns because of a pending criminal case based on her TRO and CPO violations. The request was denied. The hearing went forward, Tiare did not testify, and the DVRO was granted.

Tiare appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to continue the DVRO hearing because she had an open criminal case involving some of the same facts as the DVRO. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s ruling explaining that the 5th Amendment does not mean all civil (non-criminal) litigation must be continued because the civil case alleges all or some of the same facts as in a criminal case. Instead, courts must decide whether the 5th Amendment concern is legitimate and, if so, use the test described above to decide whether to continue the case.

View the full Case Alert for practice tips. | View the Published Opinion.

Why this case is important:

If a party cannot afford a private court reporter, and the court cannot provide a court reporter, the court must use another method to make a verbatim (word-for-word) record, like an electronic recording of the court proceeding. This case applies to all “proceedings” that take place at court – not just trials or hearings. A free verbatim record must be granted “upon request” which means if you ask for it you should get it.

The court rejected the idea that a formal fee waiver application should be required before granting the request for a free verbatim record. Courts are supposed to be “flexible” when deciding whether someone can afford to pay for a private court reporter. Courts should not be continuing matters to wait for a free court reporter, instead, if a court has electronic recording, the court must use it.

The duty to provide a verbatim record isn’t limited to cases involving fundamental rights or liberty interests – it applies to all cases.

Summary of the case:

See our dedicated page about this case.

View the full Case Alert for practice tips. | View the Published Opinion.

Why this case is important:

This case explains that indirect contact, by itself, can count as disturbing the peace of another party under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA).

• The DVPA is not limited to direct contact.
• Actions, whether committed directly, indirectly, or through a third party–including electronic technologies such as phone calls or social media–can constitute disturbing the peace.

This case explains that the totality of the circumstances must be considered when granting or denying a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (DVRO).

• The court must consider evidence of abuse over the full course of the relationship.
• The court may not limit its consideration of evidence to a particular time period, such as after the relationship has ended.

Summary of the case:

In this case, A.G., appealed the trial court’s denial of her request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former boyfriend, R.M., and granting R.M.’s request for a DVRO against her.

R.M. filed for a DVRO against A.G. alleging she had abused him, including physical abuse and repeatedly attempting to contact him after they broke up. A.G. filed her own request alleging R.M. had abused her during most of their relationship and after they broke up. Her allegations included many instances of physical and sexual abuse, harassment, violating her privacy, encouraging her to commit suicide, and damaging her professional reputation.

At the hearing on both A.G. and R.M.’s requests, the court heard testimony that after their dating relationship ended, A.G. had attempted to contact R.M. over a thousand times. The court also heard that R.M. had made numerous social media posts about A.G. These posts included intimate photographs of A.G., and personal information about A.G. and witnesses to his abuse. R.M. also changed his social media usernames to refer to A.G. using explicit and demeaning language, such as “[A.][G.]ispsycho”, “ketaminewhor[e]” and “pleasekillurself”. In addition, R.M. contacted A.G.’s witness and A.G.’s mother and told A.G.’s private information about A.G. Despite A.G.’s allegations, the court refused to hear testimony about the time period before A.G. and R.M’s relationship ended.

The court decided not to issue a DVRO against R.M. because he had not directly contacted A.G. since their relationship ended. In response to R.M.’s posts about A.G., the court suggested A.G. should stop looking at R.M.’s social media. The court granted R.M.’s request for a DVRO because of A.G.’s attempts to contact R.M. after their relationship ended.

The Court of Appeal reversed saying the trial court erred by failing to consider R.M.’s indirect contacts, such as through his social media posts and communications with her family and friends, could be abuse. The Court said A.G. had provided substantial evidence that R.M. was indirectly communicating with her in ways that disturbed her peace. Abuse under the DVPA is not limited to direct contact but includes indirect contact including through use of another person. Abuse includes contact through any means including electronic technologies.

The Court of Appeal also held that courts must consider evidence of abuse over the course of the parties’ relationship and evaluate the totality of the circumstances, instead of just considering conduct that occurred after the dating relationship ended. The Court reversed both A.G.’s denied DVRO and the DVRO granted to R.M. because in mutual DVRO cases the trial court must consider all the relevant conduct by both parties before issuing any restraining order.

View the full Case Alert for practice tips. | View the Published Opinion.

Why this case is important:

This can help your clients understand that even if they are representing themselves:

• They must follow California’s Rules of Court by only providing true and correct case citations. This means they must not cite to AI (artificial intelligence) hallucinations. They may only cite real cases and must provide correct quotations and summaries of such cases.
• They must accurately reference their case history and provide the location in the record on appeal of the case history they write about in their briefs.
• They must format their briefs in accordance with California’s Rules of Court.
• They may be sanctioned for unreasonable violations of the Rules of Court, including citing to cases that are AI hallucinations.

Summary of the case:

In this case an ex-wife appealed a trial court order modifying child support payments owed by her ex-husband. The ex-husband, who was self-represented, cited cases that do not exist and fabricated quotes that do not appear in real cases in his respondent’s brief. Also, his brief referenced hearings in his case that did not appear in the case’s record, included unsupported irrelevant factual assertions and was formatted incorrectly. In response to ex-wife’s motion to strike the respondent’s brief, ex-husband explained he used an AI tool to draft the respondent’s brief and did not verify his citations nor knowingly submit false information to the court.

The Court found ex-husband, although self-represented, should be held to the same standard as an attorney and thus was obligated to submit briefing that did not include false and missing citations. The Court also found that it could impose monetary sanctions against ex-husband because of his unreasonable violations of the Rules of Court. However, the Court chose not to sanction ex-husband because he admitted his error and the Court believed sanctions would not be in the best interest of the children at the heart of the underlying proceeding.

The precedential part of the opinion can be helpful in admonishing all litigants, including abusers, that their filings need to comply with the rules of court and be checked for accuracy to avoid AI hallucinations.

View the full Case Alert for practice tips. | View the Published Opinion.